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Abstract—Online social network (OSN) discussion groups are
exerting significant effects on political dialogue. In the absence
of access control mechanisms, any user can contribute to any
OSN thread. Individuals can exploit this characteristic to execute
targeted attacks, which increases the potential for subsequent
malicious behaviors such as phishing and malware distribution.
These kinds of actions will also disrupt bridges among the media,
politicians, and their constituencies.
For the concern of Security Management, blending malicious
cyberattacks with online social interactions has introduced a
brand new challenge. In this paper we describe our proposal for
a novel approach to studying and understanding the strategies
that attackers use to spread malicious URLs across Facebook
discussion groups. We define and analyze problems tied to
predicting the potential for attacks focused on threads created
by news media organizations. We use a mix of macro static
features and the micro dynamic evolution of posts and threads
to identify likely targets with greater than 90% accuracy. One of
our secondary goals is to make such predictions within a short
(10 minute) time frame. It is our hope that the data and analyses
presented in this paper will support a better understanding of
attacker strategies and footprints, thereby developing new system
management methodologies in handing cyber attacks on social
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of people using online social networks (OSNs)
such as Facebook and Twitter as their primary sources of
news and information has grown dramatically over the past
two decades. An important characteristic of OSNs is that they
can be used to both receive and transmit (or share) infor-
mation. Thus, anyone with Internet access can immediately
type personal responses to official posts appearing on the
White House Facebook page. This capability exposes OSNs to
constant attacks in the form of false rumors, bias propagation,
spam, and messages containing malicious URLs. Two factors
make it difficult to build objective classifiers to reduce the
potential for content-related attacks involving false rumors and
spam: (1) message definition is difficult because all audiences
have their own criteria (making it unsuitable for natural
language processing), and (2) the labeling of large amounts of
ground truth data is exceptionally expensive. Some researchers
have tried detecting non-content-related attack events such
as artificial retweets, but unlike content-related attack events,
these are more likely to appear in advertisements and other
commercial messages. In this paper we will focus on malicious
URLs because of their potential to cause significant damage
via OSNs. A large amount of cybercrime activity in the form
of phishing, cyber-bullying, and online fraud is initiated by
malicious URLs.
Handling cybercime is important in security management
operations. Cybercrime — especially that involving OSNs —
differs significantly from other forms of crime because of
the skills that attackers use to hide behind multiple fake and
compromised accounts. According to a long-held description
of criminal acts known as routine activity theory (RAT)
[1], crimes entail three essential factors: a likely offender,
a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian.
As part of our attempt to apply RAT to malicious actions
involving OSNs, we will try to determine what kinds of
OSN environments are more likely to attract the attention of
attackers, and what social activity patterns might be used to
identify them. To accomplish these goals, we will focus on
attacker motivations and incentives, using an idea from RAT
to explain attacker strategies. Our assumption is that malicious
URL attackers with limited resources tend to select targets
that produce the biggest results. Accordingly, malicious com-
ment timestamps are considered valuable tools for researchers
to examine the activities of both attackers and defenders.
Our proposed supervised learning framework is designed to
identify malicious URLs, based on observations of significant
differences in the evolving statuses of typically targeted and
non-targeted OSN threads. We found that it is possible to
predict, in near-real time, which threads are likely targets
of attacks. Further, we analyzed the timestamps of malicious
accounts that launch attacks, based on the known habits of
attackers to spread the same or similar messages.
We hope to make three contributions:
• Present a novel method for accurately identifying post
threads of interest to attackers, based on detailed evidence
involving attacker intentions.
• Provide a detailed analysis of attackers in terms of their
digital footprints and patterns, based on data gathered
from more than 40,000 Facebook pages.
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• Identify relative time intervals between consecutive at-
tacks, and the absolute times when campaigns occur after
initial posts are created. This information can be used to
determine malicious campaign synchronization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
categorize OSN security threats and summarize past research
on strategies for combating malicious behaviors targeting
OSNs. In Section III we describe our dataset and validation
method, and present a formal problem statement. In Section
IV we present and evaluate our proposed prediction framework
based on the static and dynamic features of Facebook posts. In
Section V we present our results from a temporal analysis of
malicious campaigns, and in Section VI we examine attacker
identities based on previous behaviors. A conclusion is offered
in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous researchers have studied two categories of OSN
attack strategies. The first involves analyses of illegitimate
content using lexical metadata such as average word length,
average number of words per message (message length), ratio
of uppercase to lowercase letters, and embedded URL features,
among other factors. The primary goal in many of these studies
is to distinguish spam messages from user-generated content
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]. With advancements in natural language
processing, more abstract concepts such as message topic mod-
eling [8] have been increasingly applied to build more complex
language models. However, since these approaches usually
employ blacklist filters or similar tools, they perform poorly
when attackers change their context generation algorithms.
The second group focuses on detecting fake and otherwise
compromised accounts using anomaly detection algorithms
that are either history profile-based or graph-based. Commonly
used profile characteristics are age, image, description, number
of followers, geolocation, and total number of posts. These
data are used to construct classification systems and super-
vised learning algorithms aimed at identifying and blocking
malicious accounts [9] [10] [11] [12] [13].
OSN connectivity and interaction features have been used
to experiment with graph-based approaches to identifying ac-
counts that exhibit inappropriate behaviors. Some researchers
have observed that malicious accounts tend to have few
connections with normal users but multiple connections with
each other [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]. However, to maximize
the impact and shared effect in OSNs, many spam attacks are
well-organized by a group of accounts. Consequently, a novel
detection method clustering a group of malicious accounts
has been proposed recently. A GNOME panel applet called
COMPA [20] detects compromised account by identifying
similar changes in account behaviors within a short period
of time. Two behavioral clustering approaches called Copy-
Catch [21] and SynchroTrap [22] detect accounts that exhibit
synchronized group patterns. Further, Ye et al. [23] have
used group network footprints to detect opinion spammers.
However, even though many efforts have been made to study
attacker behaviors, few researchers have looked at intentions or
acts of collusion involving two or more campaigns, especially
in terms of the kinds of targets that attackers are interested
in. One significant challenge to detecting the behaviors of
attackers is their ability to quickly alter such behaviors in order
to achieve their goals. Accordingly, there are more researchers
attempting to study the characteristics of targets that attackers
are interested in. Song et al. [24] have distinguished between
tweets receiving retweets from crowdturfing accounts and
tweets receiving retweets from normal accounts using standard
retweet-based features. Cao et al. [25] have exploited post-
based and click-based features to detect spam URLs in Twitter.
In contrast, our aim is to use thread life cycle information
(which is difficult for attackers to detect) to determine if and
when attackers have an interest in specific Facebook discussion
groups. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use a large
sample of OSN news groups (with > 160 million visitors)
to perform a temporal analysis of OSN malicious campaigns
as opposed to individual walls that may only attract small
numbers of friends and acquaintances.
III. DATA DESCRIPTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first introduce Facebook as an online
service of social media. After providing an overview scope
of discussion groups dataset, we show that how we collect
our data and how we validate the ground truth – a comment
contains malicious URLs.
A. Facebook Discussion Groups
Facebook is currently the world’s most popular OSN world-
wide. There are over 1.86 billion monthly active users which is
a 17 percent increase year over year.1 Typical of most OSNs,
participants are encouraged to create individual accounts,
manage their profiles, and build relationships by adding posts
or making comments, sharing content, or expressing their
approval of others content in the form of likes. Besides
functioning as an OSN, Facebook also plays an important role
in online social media as a user-generated content platform
for posting text, comments, digital photos, and videos — the
lifeblood of social media [26].
Professional politicians and political organizations use Face-
book to share announcements and information about what they
believe to be interesting events in order to reduce distance from
their constituencies. News organizations also rely on Face-
book pages to encourage and support interactions with their
audiences. Compared to ego networks, Facebook discussion
groups are thought to resonate better with users who have
weak ties with other users [27]. According to Granovetter et
al. [28], individuals with few or weak ties tend to be deprived
of information from distant social system locations, and are
therefore confined to news from local sources and the views
of close friends. From attacker perspectives, the interpersonal
networks that exist within and between Facebook discussion
groups are more suitable than personal walls for launching
attacks. The diffusion of rumors and other bits of information
1https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/
tend to be moderated by friend relationships, meaning that
they are more likely to flow through groups of individuals
with weak ties. Facebook discussion groups are much more
popular than personal walls — three examples are CNN, Fox
News, and The White House. Since these and similar groups
do not have privacy setting concerns, they are invaluable for
researchers interested in conducting communication and cyber
security studies.
B. Crawled Data
Unlike tradition web crawler, OSNs crawler should consider
coverage, real-time, scale and data quality. The most important
thing is the re-crawling process since Facebook Discussion
Groups are constantly receiving new posts and replies from
hundreds of millions users around the clock. Our Data was
crawled by an open source social crawler 2 SINCERE system
[29] from 2011 to 2014. We focus on main news media pages
in Asia, United States, Middle East and Europe. In the United
States area, we also pay attention to two well-famous pages:
Barack Obama and The White House. On each discussion
page, each article and corresponding comments were collected
in our database. Detailed information includes timestamps,
Facebook account identification number and the raw texts of
comments and articles. Totally we have 471,834 posts and
42,703,463 comments over ten pages on Facebook. The full
dataset is described in Table I. The most important terms used
in this study are defined as follows:
• Page: a public discussion group
• Original post: an article posted on a Facebook discussion
group
• Comment: articles written in response to an original post
• Post thread: the original post and all responses.
• Malicious comment: a comment whose raw text contains
at least one malicious URL verified by our ground truth
method.
• Target post: any thread containing at least one malicious
comment.
• Non-target post: a post thread with no malicious com-
ments.
• Attackers: a set of OSN users who leave comments, with
at least one comment identified as malicious.
• Time series TS: TScreated indicates the precise time
when an original post or comment is added to a page.
TScreated(post) indicates the time an original article is
posted. TSj indicates a time period j following the time
of the original post, measured in minutes. TSfinal refers
to the precise time 1 hour after the original post was
created (i.e., final = 60).
• Number of comments Ncomment (post,TSi): the number
of post comments collected at TSi
• Accumulated number of participants AccNcomment
(post,TSi): the number of post comments between TSi
and TSi−1.
2https://github.com/dslfaithdev/SocialCrawler
C. Ground truth Method and Problem statement
In this section, we show that how do we evaluate our result
and provide an official problem statement.
1) Ground truth:
Our intention was to find a way to automatically identify and
label malicious comments. The first step was to determine
whether or not the raw text of a comment contained one or
more URLs. When it did, we checked to see if it contained a
redirect to a URL shortening service, and if so, we recovered
the original URL. Next, each obtained URL was stored accord-
ing to a key-value structure, in which the key was the URL
domain, and the values included page identification number,
post thread identification number, Facebook user identification
number, and timestamp. Data were sorted according to indi-
vidual keys.
We then used URLblacklists 3 to categorize the extracted
URLs. This commercial service, which provides lists of specif-
ically categorized websites to its subscribers, is included in
web-filtering tools such as SquidGuard 4. In this study we
considered 4 malicious URL domains from the 111 categories
available to URLblacklists users: ads: advert servers and
banned URLs; malware: websites known to contain malware,
viruses, trojan horses, or backdoors; phishing: sites known for
attempting to trick users into giving out private information;
and porn: pornography. We also processed blacklisted URLs
according to a key-value data structure in which keys represent
individual URLs and values represent categories. Last, for the
two sorted key-value hashmaps we used two indexes (starting
from the first of each sorted list), where time complexity is
O(log(mn)), with m representing the number of URLs in our
dataset and n the number of blacklisted URLs. Our experiment
used more than 5M comments with URLs and 1M blacklisted
URLs, indicating a need for an efficient algorithm to perform
labeling on a large scale.
2) Problem statement:
As stated above, our goal is to predict which posts are more
likely to attract (and subsequently spread) malicious URLs.
In other words, for any post thread p in a social media
platform discussion group, the main target detection problem is
predicting whether p contains at least one malicious comment
via a classifier — c →{target, nontarget} — based on
one set of Fmacro macro static post features and one set
of Fmicro micro dynamic features. Since neither Fmacro nor
Fmicro are related to content, they are difficult for attackers
to comprehend. In the following section we will describe in
detail their features and our proposal for a classifier.
IV. FEATURES AND PREDICTION
Since attackers are likely to attempt to spread malicious
URLs during periods of peak discussion activity in order to
influence the largest potential audience, a useful strategy for
studying attacker behavior is identifying malicious comments
across a series of discussion threads. In this section we
3http://urlblacklist.com/
4http://www.squidguard.org
TABLE I: Data description
Page Name Location Target Posts Non-target Posts Total Comments
Middle East
Iraq News Irbil, Iraq 63 30,663 3,372,773
RassdNewsN Cairo, Egypt 18 48,559 4,819,892
Syrian Revolution Aleppo, Syria 213 187,690 2,667,453
Asia
Taiwan Apples Taipei, Taiwan 110 32,364 2,175,145
Europe
Le Monde Paris, France 119 14,822 1,058,524
BBC News London, UK 133 2,719 827,752
US News
CNN New York 361 142,409 3,623,306
FOX New York 486 3,535 6,910,484
US Politics
Barack Obama D.C. 1,297 2,110 10,647,232
The Obama White House D.C. 1,052 3,111 6,600,902
will examine the characteristics of target and non-target post
threads in terms of popularity and evolution over time. This
serves as the basis for our prediction framework and evaluation
procedure.
A. Macro static features
Identifying OSN content that is likely to attract traffic and
user interaction is a core issue for researchers. Two concepts
from the fields of communications and psychology — the
bandwagon effect [30] and information cascades [31] — have
been used to explain article popularity and duration. We will
address popularity features first.
1) Spanning Time: OSNs use recommendation systems to
promote information on homepages. Every post thread
has its own life cycle, although determining how each
OSN implements its respective life cycle is a challenging
task. We observed that targeted post threads tend to have
longer survival times. In this study, post thread span time
was defined as the number of days from the creation of
a timestamp for a post thread to the timestamp of its last
received comment.
2) Number of Comments: Anyone who has spent time
reviewing an OSN has observed that some post threads
have large numbers of comments while others have none
or very few. The total number of responses to a post can
serve as a simple indicator of post thread popularity.
3) Number of Participants: Since individual users can post
multiple responses in a thread, care must be taken to
determine the precise number of participants.
4) Number of Likes regarding posts: It is important to
remember that it takes much less effort to register a like
than it is to write and post a response.
5) Number of Likes regarding all corresponding comments:
This metric reflects the number of users who agree with
individual comments rather than the original post.
Figure 1 shows data for cumulative distribution function
(CDF) macro static features between target and non-target
posts. As shown, target post threads had longer duration times;
for non-target posts the duration times were less than 10
minutes. According to Figure 1 , posts that are likely targets
tend to attract more likes, comments, and users than non-target
posts — evidence that attackers make the necessary effort to
find popular threads.
B. Micro dynamic evolving life time
The literature contains few studies focused on thread du-
ration. We believe that longer durations, longer discussions,
and larger numbers of opinions should be expected for threads
discussing political news, for subjective announcement threads
(e.g. ObamaCare), and threads aimed at more heterogeneous
audiences. When attempting to identify correlations (if any)
between post thread participation and elapsed time, Wang et
al. [30] found that the first 15 minutes are critical for thread
development. Castillo et al. [32] improved the timeliness
aspect of predictive models for news article total visits and
shelf life by incorporating social media reactions. We used
a similar idea to clarify whether post threads are promoted
to attackers by OSN recommendation systems — that is,
we analyzed temporal thread development using the variables
twindow and tfinal.
To establish a definition for discussion atmosphere vector
(DAV), we first used the definition of accumulated number
of participants given in section 3.2, using 5 minutes for the
i value and 1 hour for the tfinal value. This resulted in the
following equation:
DAV (Post)tn = [AccNcomment(Post, t1),
AccNcomment(Post, t2), ...,
AccNcomment(Post, tn)]
(1)
In the example shown in Figure 2, for the initial ti,
AccNcomment(Post, ti) increases slightly, peaks, and expe-
riences a long-tail decay. We then used DAV to classify target
and non-target post threads based on dynamically committed
comments with respect to time, since each DAV element
represents the number of comments accumulated in each ti.
Figure 3 presents CDF data for target and non-target posts
for DAV40mins with a time window of 5 minutes. As shown,
in most cases target posts have larger numbers of comments
than non-target posts for each time slot.
Fig. 1: Macro Static Features CDFs between targets and non-target posts
Fig. 2: Classical post decay with respect to time
Fig. 3: Post DAVs between target and non-target posts during
the first 40 minutes following initial posts after posts created
C. Evaluation
In the real world dataset described in Table I, we noted an
obvious imbalance between target and non-target posts, and
therefore used Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique
(SMOTE) [33] to balance the dataset. We then normalized both
macro static and micro dynamic features so that their values
were between 0 and 1, using 75% of the data for training
purposes and saving the rest for testing three popular machine
learning classifiers, Naive Bayes, Adaboost and Decision Tree
from the scikit-learn library [34], and we use the evaluation
tools introduced in Section III.
Table II presents classification results for macro static and
micro dynamic features, respectively. Our results indicate good
robustness for the micro dynamic feature in predicting target
TABLE II: Classifier evaluation data
Classifier Precision Recall F1 score
Macro static features
Naive Bayes 0.72 0.68 0.66
Adaboost 0.77 0.76 0.76
Decision Tree 0.95 0.95 0.95
Micro Dynamic Features (1 hour)
Naive Bayes 0.85 0.85 0.85
Adaboost 0.87 0.87 0.87
Decision Tree 0.96 0.96 0.96
Mixed Features
Naive Bayes 0.78 0.73 0.72
Adaboost 0.86 0.86 0.86
Decision Tree 0.98 0.98 0.98
Fig. 4: F1 score with respect to tfinal = 60 minutes
posts with low false positive rates. We then attempted to
determine the optimum time for collecting comments for each
time window — that is, the best value for tfinal. According to
the data shown in Figure 4, it took ten minutes to achieve an
F1-score of approximately 0.8. While a large number of time
slots would definitely improve these results, it is important to
consider the consequent increase in time required to train the
model.
Fig. 5: CDFs of malicious campaign occurrences plotted
against life stages of targeted threads.
V. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF MALICIOUS CAMPAIGNS
After selecting appropriate target posts, we turned our
attention to temporal considerations. We used several temporal
variables to analyze attacker strategies. A temporal analysis
of detected malicious URLs was required, based on our
observation that attack timestamps can serve as useful digital
evidence for forensic purposes. After identifying targets based
on the DAV and popularity features described in section IV,
we tried to determine the most likely thread stage for attacks
(early, middle or late), and whether attacks tend to occur within
specific time periods or if they are randomly distributed. We
examined these questions across different regions and different
types of malicious URLs.
A. Hotspot Crime time
In a typical OSN scenario, initial posts are followed by
a period of concentrated discussion, and as time progresses,
intervals between consecutive comments increase. Since at-
tackers want to reach the largest number of thread participants,
it seems reasonable to assume that they will benefit the most by
attacking during early thread stages. However, they might want
to take advantage of the Facebook function that notifies all
previous commenters regarding new content, and wait until a
later thread stage so that all previous commenters are exposed
to the malicious URL.
To determine attacker preferences, we sorted all comments
by their comments timestamps. We then examined the oc-
currence stages of malicious URLs. Results are shown in
Figure 5. The X-axis represents the relative position of a post,
with 0 indicating the beginning of the thread and 1 the end.
The left part indicates that attackers who focused on Middle
Eastern and Asian news threads tended to launch their attacks
during early stages. Approximately 65% of attacks focused on
European and American news threads occurred during later
stages. The right part indicates that for the same countries,
phishing attacks were more likely than malware, advertising,
and porn-focused attacks to be launched during late thread
stages.
Fig. 6: CDFs of malicious campaign occurrences plotted
against amounts of time passed since the posting of initial
target thread posts.
B. Exact time after posts have been created
We attempted to determine the precise time intervals of
malicious campaigns — specifically, time intervals between
malicious URL timestamps and the dates/times that targeted
threads were created. Figure 6 presents our results in terms
of geographic area and attack type. We found that Asian
and Middle East news-oriented pages had shorter response
times, with approximately 75% of all attacks launched within
100 minutes of initial article posts, compared to only 30%
for European and American news-oriented pages. We were
impressed by our finding that nearly one-half of all attacks
were launched within one day — for Asian and Middle
East-oriented threads the rate exceeded 90%. We noticed that
approximately one-half of all attacks worldwide were launched
within one day.
C. Time interval after last attack on the same page
Attackers are motivated to distribute malicious URLs to as
many individuals as possible, via single or multiple accounts.
We believe that multiple accounts are more harmful because
such attacks can create false impressions that many people are
responding within a short time period. In order to determine
when attacks are synchronized or distributed, we examined
time intervals following preceding malicious URL attacks. The
data in Figure 7 show that attacks on pages discussing US
politics tend to be concentrated within short time periods.
Thus, when a malicious URL is detected, there is greater
than 40% probability that another malicious URL will appear
within 10 minutes, compared to 20% probability for other
pages. Regarding type, we found that malware and phishing
attacks tend to occur within shorter time periods compared to
attacks featuring advertisements and pornography.
D. Occurrence by date
We are also interested in the hotspot time for attackers
to launch malicious campaigns. Reports5 show that there
exists net army to spread fake news during election, therefore
5https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russian-propaganda-
effort-helped-spread-fake-news-during-election-experts-say/
Fig. 7: CDFs of malicious campaign occurrences plotted
against amounts of time passed since the most recent prior
attack on the same page.
Fig. 8: Heatmap evidence showing that threads in the sample
that addressed American political issues attracted more attacks
than other topics, and that threads posted in 2014 attracted
more attacks than threads posted in 2011.
we assume that malicious URLs campaigns would focus on
certain time such as the date before election or after a scandal.
Figure 8 shows the heatmap of malicious URLs distributed
across ten public pages and from 2011 to 2014, separated by
month. We observe that the number of malicious URLs on US
politics are greater than others, also 2014 is more severe than
other years.
VI. CHARACTERIZE MALICIOUS ACCOUNTS
In terms of social capital, OSN accounts with longer lifes-
pans are more valuable than those with shorter lifespans and
fake accounts. In this section we will discuss the details of
malicious messages and attackers as part of our attempt to
understand their synchronous group intentions.
A. Accounts Macro-features
In individual discussion threads it is easy to determine who
supports an idea and who does not. However, there is still value
in taking a user-oriented view to determine whether specific
users are consistent — that is, do they always commit mali-
cious campaigns, or are they sometimes posting non-malicious
content? Are they spreading the same messages to different
targets? Are they only focusing on politics-related pages? To
Fig. 9: CDFs of the macro digital footprints of thread attackers.
Fig. 10: An example of detected malicious messages posted
at least 10 times by the same account holder.
answer these questions we analyzed data gathered from more
than 40,000 public Facebook pages between 2011 and 2016.
Figure 9 presents data for the macro-features of those pages,
including total likes and comments from all 40,000 pages.
Most malicious accounts were fake, and therefore had less
activity — over 70% of those we identified had zero likes,
which is unusual in light of how easy it is to express a like
on an OSN. We found that phishing-focused accounts tended
to have fewer pages, posts, likes, and comments compared to
other types.
B. Account Digital Footprint
Except the Macro-features we described, we are also inter-
ested in each activity of malicious account. Here, we compare
history behavioral patterns and message similarity between
malicious accounts and sampled normal accounts. We sampled
10,000 normal users, 1,000 from each page in Table I. Our data
include more than 40,000 public pages around the world from
2011 to 2016.
1) Response time to post thread: Our hypothesis is that if
ones objective is attempt to launch malicious campaigns to
public, they may be usually online and wait for target posts.
Once the post thread starts, those malicious accounts would
be the first few users to lead the discussion. Second strategy
is that this duplicate messages has been propagated 10 times
by one account (Figure 10), most of them appeared in the
early stage of targets posts, the commenting time vector of this
Fig. 11: CDFs for mean numbers of user comments and their
standard deviations plotted against amounts of time passed
since the posting of initial posts.
Fig. 12: Total number of accounts in the sample plotted against
numbers of occurrences of malicious URL posts
user = [6194, 5650, 1, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18]. Here we examine
the mean and standard deviation between malicious accounts
and normal accounts, the result is as Figure 11. Obviously,
malicious accounts tends to be active in the later stage of post
threads compared with normal accounts. Moreover, we found
that the standard deviation of malicious account is apparently
greater than normal accounts, which refers that legitimate users
usually commit after a fixed time interval after a post has been
created.
2) Same content, different accounts: We clustered the ex-
actly same malicious URLs as one malicious campaign, then
we are interested in each campaign, how many accounts would
be used to perform the campaign? Figure 12 shows that
normally less than 10 accounts spread one malicious URLs,
most of them are distributed and not related. However, there
are two types campaigns needed to be considered. (1) many
accounts, one malicious URL (upper left corner of Fig. 12):
We assume this type of attacks are the most harmful on OSNs
since there must be someone behind the monitor and control
these accounts to spread the same URL. (2) One account, many
copies of malicious URL (lower right corner of Fig. 12): The
other situation is that one account spread as many copies of
malicious URL as they can.
VII. CONCLUSION
We describe our work on detecting and characterizing
large-scale malicious URLs campaigns using public Facebook
Discussion Groups dataset. The dataset includes news media
in Facebook across main regions around the world between
2011 and 2014. Totally we examine 42,703,463 comments,
and label them in an efficient way using a third party service.
Motivated by Routine Activity Theory and Information
Cascade, we present an interdisciplinary research combining
with computer science, journalism and criminology. We then
propose a novel target detection method using macro static
features regarding popularity and micro dynamic evolving life-
time in a near real-time way. Through the result, we perform
an in-depth analysis on attackers strategies. We analyze the
hotspot crime time regarding different countries and different
types of campaigns. We also calculate the occurrence time (1)
by exact date, (2) after posts have been posted and (3) after last
campaigns. Our result not only offer a recommendation system
for attackers to launch a relatively effective campaign but
also help defenders to inspect suspected targets with limited
resource.
The initial result we obtained provides us encouraging
new insight regarding cyber attacks leveraging online social
interactions. Even though we believe that there are many other
strategies to study for future work, our current observation en-
ables us to leverage these techniques to develop new response
strategies in handling such attacks.
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